Oregon v. Kennedy
| Oregon v. Kennedy | |
|---|---|
| Argued March 29, 1982 Decided May 24, 1982 | |
| Full case name | Oregon v. Kennedy |
| Docket no. | 80-1991 |
| Citations | 456 U.S. 667 (more) 102 S. Ct. 2083; 72 L. Ed. 2d 416 |
| Holding | |
| A criminal defendant who successfully moves for a mistrial may only invoke the bar of double jeopardy in a second effort to try him if the conduct giving rise to the motion for a mistrial was prosecutorial or judicial conduct intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial. | |
| Court membership | |
| |
| Case opinions | |
| Majority | Rehnquist, joined by Burger, White, Powell, O'Connor |
| Concurrence | Brennan, joined by Marshall |
| Concurrence | Powell |
| Concurrence | Stevens, joined by Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun |
| Laws applied | |
| Double Jeopardy Clause of the U.S. Const. Amend. V | |
Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982), was a United States Supreme Court decision dealing with the appropriate test for determining whether a criminal defendant has been "goaded" by the prosecution's bad actions into motioning for a mistrial. This matters because the answer determines whether a defendant can be retried. Ordinarily, a defendant who requests a mistrial can be forced to stand trial a second time, see United States v. Dinitz. However, if the prosecution's conduct was "intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial," double jeopardy protects the defendant from retrial. The Court emphasized that only prosecutorial actions where the intent is to provoke a mistrial — and not mere "harassment" or "overreaching" — trigger the double jeopardy protection.